fix(node): harden Arweave anchoring and add verification (#26) - #224

… 2/4) (Twigpine#524)

* fix(node): ANS-104 transport, three-outcome probe, verify endpoint (Twigpine#26 split 2/4)

Reviewer 2 closed PR Twigpine#224 on 2026-08-28 with a directive: split
into four narrow PRs. This is Split PR 2 (Arweave transport and
verification).

The P1 finding the reviewer assigned to this split: the legacy
`anchor_item_present` mapped `BAD_REQUEST` and `GONE` to `Ok(false)`,
and the recovery code interpreted false as permission to reclaim the
row and pay for another upload. Neither 400 nor 410 proves a
previously paid item was never accepted: 410 can describe an
artifact that existed but is no longer served, and 400 can be
produced by gateway, proxy, or routing failure. The concrete
failure sequence the reviewer named: bundler accepts the item,
the response or terminal DB write is lost, recovery probes the
persisted item_id, the gateway returns 400 or 410, and the node
pays for a second immutable item for the same transition.

Fix: model the probe result as three outcomes, and authorize a
re-upload only on a trustworthy, protocol-defined absence.

NEW MODULE crates/gitlawb-node/src/ans104.rs
  - DataItem: the on-wire ANS-104 shape (signature, owner, target,
    anchor, tags, data — all base64url-encoded except target/anchor).
  - deep_hash: the canonical signing input per the spec. The
    signature is over a SHA-256 mix of the dataitem/list/map
    discriminators, the signature type, owner, target, anchor, the
    recursively-hashed tag list, and the data payload. A
    hand-rolled sha256 of the JSON body would produce a hash no
    Arweave gateway would recognize; the deep-hash is the only
    correct form.
  - sign_data_item: Ed25519 over deep_hash.
  - verify_data_item: parses the owner, checks the signature against
    an expected pubkey, and reports a specific failure reason on
    each branch.
  - 7 unit tests covering round-trip, flipped signature, wrong
    expected key, mutated data, wire-shape round-trip, deep-hash
    stability, and the empty-tags edge case.

NEW MODULE crates/gitlawb-node/src/arweave_v2.rs
  - ProbeOutcome: Present (2xx, body parses as ANS-104, sig
    verifies), DefinitivelyAbsent (404 with a known JSON body
    shape), Indeterminate (everything else). The reviewer's
    three-outcome model.
  - ProbeOutcome::permits_reupload: the recovery policy. ONLY
    DefinitivelyAbsent authorizes a paid re-upload. Indeterminate
    keeps the outbox non-terminal; Present skips re-payment.
  - probe_anchor_item: the gateway probe. 2xx bound to a different
    item id is Indeterminate, not Present. 2xx with a body that
    does not parse as ANS-104 is Indeterminate. Oversized bodies
    are Indeterminate (defense against body-stuffing).
  - read_capped_body: enforces PROBE_MAX_BODY_BYTES (1 MiB) on the
    full body, with a Content-Length fast-path that rejects
    before reading.
  - verify_anchor: the full path the public verify endpoint takes.
    Fetches the data item, parses it, verifies the Ed25519
    signature against the persisted node_did, decodes the data
    payload as JSON, and reports the result.
  - 15 unit tests pinning each classification boundary:
    400/410/5xx/transport/2xx-non-json/2xx-bad-sig/2xx-different-
    owner are all Indeterminate; 404 with empty or known-JSON
    body is DefinitivelyAbsent; 2xx with a valid signed item is
    Present; the re-upload policy is exhaustive.

NEW DB METHOD crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs
  - get_arweave_anchor_by_item_id: looks up an existing
    arweave_anchors row by its id (which is the Irys tx id, the
    same value the Arweave gateway uses to serve the data item).
    Used by the public verify endpoint to fetch the persisted
    node_did so the envelope signature can be verified against it.

NEW CONFIG crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs
  - GITLAWB_ARWEAVE_GATEWAY_URL: the Arweave gateway the probe
    reads from. Defaults to https://arweave.net; operators can
    point it at a private mirror.

NEW HTTP ENDPOINT crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/arweave.rs
  - GET /api/v1/arweave/anchors/verify/{item_id}: the public
    verify endpoint. Returns {item_id, status, verified,
    owner_did, data_payload, error} where status is one of
    "verified" / "definitively_absent" / "indeterminate".
  - 3 endpoint-level tests covering the verified, 404, and 400
    shapes via the live router, asserting the public surface
    surfaces the three outcomes.

WIRE-UP crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs
  - The verify route is registered alongside the existing
    /api/v1/arweave/anchors list route.

NOT IN THIS SLICE (the bundler upload, the next commit):
  - The handler that builds a DataItem from a ref-cert and POSTs
    it to the bundler is not in this PR. The ANS-104 module is
    ready to be called by it; the cert/push-event flow in PR 1
    persists the row that the bundler upload would consume.
  - PR 1's recovery drain produces an `anchor_jobs` row keyed on
    the (repo, ref, old, new) tuple; the next slice reads that row,
    builds the ANS-104 data item, POSTs to the bundler, and writes
    the resulting tx id to arweave_anchors.

Compiles clean, 1113 tests pass with 0 regressions, clippy clean
under -D warnings, fmt clean.

Cross-PR overlap (declared in the PR description):

  - Twigpine#134 (anchors auth): composes. The verify endpoint reads from
    arweave_anchors; Twigpine#134's auth layer applies unchanged. The
    probe model is server-side and unauthenticated by design.
  - Twigpine#285 (advisory-lock session affinity): independent. The probe
    is read-only.
  - Twigpine#306 (Content-Digest on signed requests): independent. The
    probe does not sign requests.
  - Twigpine#314 (small-order Ed25519): composes. The verify path calls
    Did::to_verifying_key which already enforces the small-order
    check from Twigpine#314.
  - Twigpine#324 (libp2p keypair persistence): independent.
  - Twigpine#325 (gossip ref-update auth): independent. The verify path
    is for the public Arweave gateway, not gossip.
  - Twigpine#382 (replication withheld-subtree trees): independent.

* fix(node): address reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 2/4 (transport)

- P1 (DB lookup): get_arweave_anchor_by_item_id now filters on
  irys_tx_id (the externally-routable item id) rather than the
  internal UUID primary key. The production writer stores a fresh
  UUID in `id` and the Irys response / ANS-104 derived id in
  `irys_tx_id`; the old filter would always 404. New
  integration tests exercise the production writer path with
  distinct values for the two columns.
- P1 (verify-gate): verify_anchor now gates on repo read via
  authorize_repo_read. The route is split in server.rs: the
  public list_anchors stays ungated (Twigpine#134 tracks that surface),
  the verify route gets optional_signature per the team memory
  `axum-layer-vs-merge-pitfall.md`. Denials on row-lookup, gate,
  and missing repo all collapse to the same opaque 404 so the
  public endpoint does not leak anchor-row existence.
- P1 (ANS-104 deep-hash): rewritten to the verified SHA-384
  recursive list/blob algorithm (matches `arbundles` JS
  reference). deep_hash returns [u8; 48]; signature is over the
  raw 48-byte digest. Three reference vectors from
  `Irys-xyz/arbundles/src/__tests__/deepHash.spec.ts` are
  bit-exact-asserted as the interop canary per the team memory
  `self-roundtrip-tests-do-not-prove-interop.md`.
- P1 (artifact-identity): v2 verify now derives the protocol id
  via DataItem::id() (base64url(SHA256(signature))) and requires
  equality with the requested URL item_id. A node key signs
  many data items, so a valid signature only proves who signed
  the response — not that the served item is the one the caller
  asked to verify. The team memory
  `verify-against-artifact-id-not-signer.md` is the policy.
- P1 (verifier can't read this head's writes): verify_anchor
  now accepts BOTH the v2 ANS-104 format and the v1 raw-JSON
  shape the live path on this branch actually writes. The v1
  path does a field-equality check on repo, ref_name, old_sha,
  new_sha, node_did against the persisted row (no signature in
  v1; Irys storage plus the JSON parse are the integrity
  guarantee).
- P2 (ProbeOutcome in result): AnchorVerifyResult now carries
  outcome: ProbeOutcome. The HTTP handler maps the structured
  field to the status string instead of parsing the human-
  readable error message — any future wording change in
  arweave_v2.rs can no longer silently reclassify a
  DefinitivelyAbsent as Indeterminate.
- P2 (empty 404 body): classify_404 returns Indeterminate for
  bodyless 404s. The team memory
  `distinguish-unknown-from-empty.md` is the policy: a
  bodyless 404 from a proxy is not a proof of absence, and the
  recovery policy (permits_reupload -> true on
  DefinitivelyAbsent) authorizes a paid, irreversible re-upload.
- P2 (streaming cap): read_capped_body no longer uses
  resp.bytes() (which buffers the full response before checking
  size). It now reads chunk-by-chunk and aborts the moment the
  cumulative byte count crosses the cap, so a chunked response
  without Content-Length cannot force unbounded allocation.

* fix(node): address three reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 2/4 (round 2)

* fix(node): address five reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 2/4 (round 3)

* fix(node): address reviewers round-4 on Twigpine#26 split 2/4 (interop)

* fix(node): address coderabbit on Twigpine#26 split 2/4 (raw tags, vint overflow, golden key)

* fix(node): enforce artifact-id in probe_item on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* fix(node): require expected owner for probe Present on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* fix(node): narrow Twigpine#26 split 2/4 to codec and policy types

* fix(node): silence dead-code for deferred slice API on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* fix(node): doc and bounds-check cleanup in ans104 on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* docs(node): point tests doc at Ed25519 golden script on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* fix(node): strict owner lengths, sign-before-hash on Twigpine#26 split 2/4

* fix(node): keep ans104 tags and field widths consistent on hash and encode

DataItem keeps both the decoded `tags` and the original Avro `raw_tags`, both
public. After a parse, changing `tags` left deep_hash and verify_data_item
using the stale raw bytes, and to_binary wrote a header tag count that no
longer matched the payload, so the frame failed to parse back.

Take the tag block for hashing and encoding from one helper that decodes
`raw_tags` and requires it to equal `tags`, and fail closed otherwise. The
header count comes from the same validated pairs. Parsed multi-block and
size-prefixed items still re-encode byte-exact and keep their signatures.

deep_hash now also rejects a non-empty target or anchor that is not 32 bytes,
as to_binary already does, so sign_data_item fails instead of signing an item
that cannot be encoded. The legacy non-base64url anchor fallback is kept.

The module and signature-type docs now say binary parsing accepts sigtypes 1
to 4 while signing and verifying are Ed25519 only on this slice.

* build(scripts): declare the golden script's direct npm dependencies

ans104_golden_ed25519.mjs imports bs58, @noble/ed25519 and base64url, and
ans104_golden.mjs imports base64url, but package.json listed only arbundles, so
they resolved only through hoisting. Declare them at the versions already
locked, update the lockfile root entry (no resolved version or hash changes),
and note the regeneration command in the golden output file.

---------

Co-authored-by: Gravirei <gravirei@users.noreply.github.com>

…e#537)

* docs: state that GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH defaults to true

PR Twigpine#330 flipped the code default to true and updated .env.example, the
README env-var table, the AWS guide, the macOS app, and docs/RUN-A-NODE.md,
but two prose mentions in operator-facing docs still describe the
opposite. SECURITY.md line 57 ("Repository write authorization defaults"
section) and README.md line 69 (Known limitations) both say the flag
"defaults to `false`", which contradicts the live runtime and the rest
of the same files. Reviewer 2 closed Twigpine#224 with this as the P2 finding
to fix in the config-and-policy split.

The correct text already exists in the README env-var table; the prose
restatements were missed. Bring the prose into line with the code.

- SECURITY.md: rewrite the section to lead with the default being true
  and describe `false` as the explicit rolling-upgrade override.
- README.md: rewrite the known-limitations bullet to state the default
  is true and the `false` opt-out is a rolling-upgrade only.
- Add `crates/gitlawb-node/tests/owner_push_default_docs.rs`: a
  regression guard that reads the four surfaces (clap default, .env.example,
  README known-limitations prose, README env-var table, SECURITY.md) and
  asserts each one says the default is `true`. Reverting either doc edit
  turns one named test red; flipping `default_value_t` back to `false`
  turns the env example test red. Each surface is checked independently
  so a stale doc lies alone.

No code change. No new migration. No dependency change. Compiles clean,
clippy clean under `-D warnings`.

Refs: closes the P2 finding from the review of Twigpine#224.

* fix(docs): clarify default value consistency for GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH

* docs(readme): drop the default-open roadmap line and the em-dash punctuation

---------

Co-authored-by: Gravirei <gravirei@users.noreply.github.com>

…plit 3/4) (Twigpine#548)

* fix(node): version ref_certificates for forward compat (Twigpine#26 split 3/4)

Reviewer 2 closed PR Twigpine#224 on 2026-08-28 with a directive: split
into four narrow PRs. This is Split PR 3 (certificate / CLI
compatibility). No findings are assigned to it; it is required
because the protocol/client work is independently reviewable and
should not remain coupled to post-receive recovery.

The wire-format problem: the ref-cert payload is a fixed 7-field
JSON blob the node signs. Future changes (additional pusher
attestations, content-binding fields, secondary signatures) would
either break every existing cert or be impossible to ship without
a flag day. Versioning the cert makes the format forward-compat
and explicit.

NEW MIGRATION v28
  ref_certificates gains `version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1`.
  DEFAULT 1 means an existing row reads as v1 with no backfill
  needed; NOT NULL means a missing value is a hard error rather
  than a silent v0.

NEW FIELD ON RefCertificate
  `version: u32`. v1 is the pre-versioning 7-field payload
  (no `version` key in the signed JSON, so a v1 cert is
  byte-for-byte identical to today's cert). v2+ certs will
  include a `version` key and any new fields, both
  backwards-compatible: an old client reading a v2 cert sees the
  unknown `version` field and either ignores it (graceful) or
  refuses to verify (explicit).

API CHANGES
  - list_certs and get_cert now include `version` in the JSON
    response.
  - issue_ref_certificate sets `version: 1` on every new cert.

GL CHANGES
  - gl cert show reads the `version` field; missing field
    defaults to 1 (forward-compat with old servers). v1 certs
    go through the unchanged verify path. v2+ certs are
    explicitly rejected with an "upgrade the client" message
    rather than silently guessing the payload shape — a future
    client that supports v2 cannot accidentally treat a v1 cert
    as v2.

GOLDEN-FORMAT FIXTURE
  v1_payload_matches_frozen_canonical_form pins the v1 signing
  payload byte-for-byte. Reverting this to a v2 shape (adding a
  `version` key) is what the versioned format forbids: an old
  client reading a v1 cert must not see a `version` key in the
  signed JSON. The same byte-form is what gl's verify_signature
  reconstructs in crates/gl/src/cert.rs, so any drift between
  node and CLI breaks the test instead of silently rendering
  every real cert INVALID.

TESTS
  - 3 v1_payload_tests in crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs:
    frozen-canonical-form, round-trip structural, default
    version is 1.
  - 2 new tests in crates/gl/src/cert.rs:
    missing_version_defaults_to_1_and_verifies,
    explicit_version_1_takes_v1_path.
  - 12 existing ref_certificate_tests still pass with the
    version column added.

Compiles clean, 1091 tests pass with 0 regressions, gl 4 cert
tests pass, clippy clean under -D warnings, fmt clean.

Cross-PR overlap (declared in the PR description):

  - Twigpine#134 (anchors auth): independent. The cert API is unchanged
    in shape; auth gates apply as before.
  - Twigpine#285 (advisory-lock session affinity): independent.
  - Twigpine#306 (Content-Digest on signed requests): independent.
  - Twigpine#314 (small-order Ed25519): independent. v1 certs verify
    through the same path, which already enforces the small-
    order check from Twigpine#314 on the embedded node DID.
  - Twigpine#324 (libp2p keypair persistence): independent.
  - Twigpine#325 (gossip ref-update auth): independent. PR 1's signed
    HTTP push is the durable-intent producer; this PR owns the
    cert shape. The two PRs read and write the same cert table
    but do not step on each other (PR 1 calls
    issue_ref_certificate_idempotent; this PR keeps the
    deterministic cert id but does not change who calls what).
  - Twigpine#382 (replication withheld-subtree trees): independent.

* fix(node,gl): address review feedback on cert version compat

- Drop the duplicate `version` ALTER from the v1 migration bundle; v28
  is now the sole owner of the column.
- Add a v28 upgrade-path test (v25/v26 pattern) that seeds a legacy
  pre-v28 ref_certificates row, drops the column + migration record,
  re-runs migrations, and asserts DEFAULT 1 + legacy row reads as v1.
- Extract a shared `v1_signing_payload` builder so the live signer
  and the frozen-vector test share one literal; a regression in the
  signer now fails the test.
- Tighten gl's `version` parsing: missing key → v1, present value
  must be a JSON integer that fits in u32 and equals 1. Null, strings,
  floats, overflow, and unknown versions all return Err instead of
  collapsing to v1 (Reviewer 2). Add a truth-table test pinning every
  cell of the parser.
- Extend the v1 forward-compat tests to actually round-trip through
  `verify_signature`, and add a regression test that pins the verdict
  branch rejects v2 even when the v1 signature would otherwise verify.

* fix(cert): address CI failures on PR Twigpine#386

- cargo fmt --all (CI fmt check was red on the prior commit)
- v28 upgrade-path test: switch version_column_default from
  fetch_one to fetch_optional, so a pre-v28 database with the
  column dropped returns Ok(None) rather than RowNotFound. The
  precondition assertion is what detects a missing column;
  RowNotFound would have masked a regression.
- clippy `needless_borrow` on the v2 verdict-branch test:
  drop the leading `&` on `cert_json["signature"].as_str()`.

* fix(gl,node): make the v2 rejection and issuer anchor real, and test them as such

Round-2 findings, all three demonstrated by execution:

- cmd_show's Ok(v != 1) verdict arm was dead code (parse_cert_version
  admits only 1), and the test aimed at it copied the match instead of
  calling the command. The match now mirrors the parser's contract and
  two end-to-end mockito tests drive cmd_show itself: a version-2 cert
  with a valid v1 signature fails --verify with the version named.

- --verify no longer accepts the queried node's self-reported DID as a
  trust anchor: the node that served a forged cert can serve a matching
  self-report, and that fallback passed a wholly forged certificate with
  exit 0. --verify now requires --expect-node before claiming a trusted
  issuer, with a test proving the refusal (and the anchored positive
  control passing).

- The node-side version test asserted version == 1 on its own literal;
  it now cross-checks the issuing construction: a version-1 claim must
  verify against the v1 payload builder's bytes rebuilt from the cert's
  own fields, and the v1 payload must carry no version key.

* fix(node,gl): address round-2 reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 3/4 cert compat

BREAKING CHANGE: gl cert show <id> --verify now requires --expect-node <did>; the node's self-reported DID is no longer trusted as a cert anchor.

* fix(node): bind cert v2 test to live issuer via sqlx::test

* fix(node,gl): address round-3 reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 3 cert compat

- Stamp new certs v1 until v2 verifier ships; v2 issuance refused by shipped gl
- Add v2_signing_payload with version in signed bytes, downgrade test
- Verify signature in well-formed test, add DB read-back to issuer test
- Fix README/db comments and version-refusal message

* fix(gl): route cert list through error_for_status; correct cert show example

Round 4 reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 3 cert compat:

- P2 (cert.rs:113): cmd_list called .json() straight through on the
  cert list endpoint and let a gated 404 (whose body lacks a
  `certificates` key) fall into the empty-list branch, printing "No
  ref certificates" with exit 0. Wire cmd_list through the same
  error_for_status() gate that cmd_show and resolve_cert_id already
  use, and pin the new behavior with a load-bearing test
  (`cmd_list_surfaces_gated_404_as_err`) that drives cmd_list end
  to end against a 404 mock. cmd_show is unchanged.

- P3 (README.md:314): the documented `gl cert show <id> --verify`
  example bound the certificate ID as the REPO positional, because
  the parser is `gl cert show [OPTIONS] <REPO> <ID>`. Insert the
  missing `<repo>` positional so the example matches the CLI
  parser.

The original BREAKING CHANGE footer in bb553b6 carried the same
shortened `gl cert show <id> --verify` example; this commit's
footer supersedes it with the canonical command, which is what
release-note scrapers read. The round-2 commit message itself is
left in history unchanged; the new footer is the one callers
should rely on.

BREAKING CHANGE: gl cert show <repo> <id> --verify requires --expect-node <did>; the queried node's self-reported DID is no longer accepted as a cert anchor.

* style(gl): fix fmt in cert list response parsing

* fix(gl): label version refusals distinctly and clean cert show help

A cert declaring an unsupported version printed INVALID, which reads as
a failed Ed25519 check even though verify_signature never ran. The
display now prints UNSUPPORTED VERSION for version refusals and keeps
INVALID for real signature failures. The Show help no longer cites
review rounds or commit history.

* docs(node): align RefCertificate.version rustdoc with the signed-bytes v2 contract

---------

Co-authored-by: Gravirei <gravirei@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <kevin@gitlawb.com>

…split 1/4) (Twigpine#558)

* fix(node): durable post-receive outbox at the DB layer (Twigpine#26 split 1/4)

Reviewer 2 closed PR Twigpine#224 on 2026-08-28 with a directive: split the
work into four narrow PRs. This is Split PR 1 (durable post-receive
lifecycle) at the DB layer; the handler refactor in
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:2007 (git_receive_pack) lands in
the next slice so the test can drive the failure injection end-to-end.

The pre-outbox crash window the reviewer flagged: receive_pack can
apply a ref to disk and return Ok, and a process exit, a dropped
future, or a DB failure before the bookkeeping at
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:2361 (push event + cert + webhook)
loses the recovery record. Startup drain enumerates only sources
written from that bookkeeping, so it cannot reconstruct the missing
work. The partial fallback that re-derives from a row present in the
bookkeeping substitutes did:key:recovered and an empty attestation,
which is not equivalent to the original authenticated push.

This commit adds the durable boundary the handler will lean on.

NEW TABLE pending_ref_transitions (migration v27):
  - Written by the handler BEFORE smart_http::receive_pack, in state
    'prepared', carrying the verified pusher DID, the raw RFC 9421
    signature header, signature-input, and content-digest that
    authorized the push, the request id, and the parsed ref update.
  - The handler transitions the row to 'applied' on receive_pack Ok
    or 'cancelled' on Err. The drain reads only 'applied'.
  - A failed or cancelled receive-pack therefore leaves the row in
    'prepared' or 'cancelled', which the drain never promotes. This
    is what closes the reviewer's second proof ("a failed or cancelled
    receive-pack does not turn a prepared intent into completed
    accounting or anchoring").

NEW TABLE anchor_jobs (migration v27, owned by PR 1, consumed by PR 2):
  - One row per (repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) transition.
    PR 1 inserts it on 'applied'; PR 2 reads it and updates claimed_at.
  - ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING makes the insert idempotent on the
    deterministic id, so a recovery re-pass cannot create a second
    upload request. This is the handoff boundary; the bundler call
    itself is PR 2.

NEW DB METHODS on Db:
  - insert_pending_ref_transitions: writes one 'prepared' row per
    ref update, returns the persisted rows.
  - mark_pending_ref_transitions_applied / _cancelled: state flip,
    gated on the FROM state, idempotent.
  - list_pending_ref_transitions_applied: drain query, oldest first.
  - delete_pending_ref_transition: called by recovery after the
    artifacts land; a third pass is a no-op.
  - record_push_with_id: ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING on the
    deterministic id.
  - insert_ref_certificate_idempotent: ON CONFLICT (repo_id, ref_name)
    DO NOTHING, returns None if a live-path cert already exists.
  - insert_anchor_job_idempotent: ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING on the
    deterministic per-transition id.

NEW HELPERS in db/mod.rs:
  - deterministic_id: SHA-256 hex with an ASCII Unit Separator
    between fields so two distinct tuples never collide on prefix
    overlap.
  - push_event_id_for, ref_cert_id_for, anchor_job_id_for: the
    derived ids above, one helper per artifact so a caller cannot
    derive a wrong id by mistake.

NEW STRUCTS:
  - PendingRefTransition: the row shape.
  - AnchorJob: the handoff row shape.
  - pending_state: const strings ('prepared' / 'applied' /
    'cancelled') shared by tests, the producer, and the drain so a
    typo on one side cannot silently mismatch the other.

NEW TESTS in db::pending_ref_transition_tests (8 tests, all green):
  - insert_then_mark_applied_flips_state_for_every_ref: producer
    contract.
  - mark_applied_is_idempotent_on_repeat: re-fire is a no-op.
  - cancelled_rows_are_not_returned_by_the_drain: reviewer's second
    proof at the DB layer.
  - prepared_rows_are_not_returned_by_the_drain: same proof for the
    pre-flip state (handler crashed before reaching post-Ok).
  - mark_cancelled_is_idempotent_on_repeat: counterpart.
  - drain_then_re_derive_is_idempotent: reviewer's first proof at
    the DB layer. Inserts a row in 'applied' state directly via
    insert_pending_ref_transition_for_test, drains it, derives the
    artifact ids twice, exercises record_push_with_id and
    insert_anchor_job_idempotent directly, asserts exactly one push
    event row and exactly one anchor job row regardless of how many
    times the drain runs.
  - deterministic_id_avoids_prefix_overlap_collisions: the
    separator regression test.
  - push_event_id_for_is_stable: derived ids match across calls and
    differ on each varied input.

OTHER:
  - Make RefUpdate and its fields pub(crate) so the DB methods can
    iterate the parsed ref updates. No public API change.

NOT IN THIS SLICE (the handler refactor, next commit):
  - The receive-pack handler does not yet call insert_pending_ref_
    transitions before the receive_pack call, nor mark_applied /
    mark_cancelled after. The DB layer is in place for it; the
    handler will call these methods and the startup drain will be
    wired in main.rs.
  - The startup drain in main.rs is not yet called; it will iterate
    list_pending_ref_transitions_applied, re-derive the artifacts,
    and delete the row.
  - The cert/push event issuance in cert.rs and the bookkeeping in
    api/repos.rs:2361 are not yet changed to use the deterministic
    ids. The helper functions exist and are tested; the callers
    follow.

Compiles clean, clippy clean under -D warnings, fmt clean.

* fix(node): wire durable outbox into the receive-pack handler (Twigpine#26 split 1/4)

This is the handler-level half of Split PR 1. The previous commit
added the migration and the DB methods; this one threads them
through crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs:2007 (git_receive_pack),
the cert issuer, and the startup drain.

CHANGES IN THE HANDLER
======================

In git_receive_pack, AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT before the
smart_http::receive_pack call, the handler now:

  1. Generates a per-handler request_id (UUID).
  2. Captures the raw Signature, Signature-Input, and Content-Digest
     headers from the request.
  3. Calls db.insert_pending_ref_transitions(request_id, ...) which
     writes one row per ref update in state 'prepared'.

The receive_pack call runs as before. After it returns:

  4. On Ok: db.mark_pending_ref_transitions_applied(request_id) —
     the row is the ONLY thing that promotes a 'prepared' row to
     'applied', and the drain reads only 'applied' rows. A process
     crash before this call leaves the row in 'prepared', which the
     drain never promotes.
  5. On Err: db.mark_pending_ref_transitions_cancelled(request_id) —
     a failed receive_pack leaves the row in 'cancelled', which the
     drain never promotes.

This is what closes the reviewer's two proofs:

  Proof 1 (crash window): if the process dies after
  mark_pending_ref_transitions_applied but before the bookkeeping
  writes, the row is in 'applied' and the next startup drain
  re-derives the push event, the per-ref certificate (carrying the
  ORIGINAL pusher DID, not a placeholder), and the anchor handoff.
  The drain uses the persisted authentic pusher DID and signature
  header, not a recovered placeholder.

  Proof 2 (failed receive-pack): the row is only ever flipped to
  'applied' in the explicit Ok branch above. A 'prepared' or
  'cancelled' row is invisible to the drain, so a failed or dropped
  receive_pack cannot turn a prepared intent into completed
  accounting or anchoring.

BOOKKEEPING IS NOW DETERMINISTIC-ID
===================================

The post-Ok bookkeeping at api/repos.rs:2448 now uses:

  - record_push_with_id with push_event_id_for(request_id, first_ref)
    — ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING, so a recovery re-pass is a no-op.
  - issue_ref_certificate_idempotent with
    ref_cert_id_for(request_id, ref_name) — ON CONFLICT (repo_id,
    ref_name) DO NOTHING, returns None if a live-path cert already
    exists.
  - insert_anchor_job_idempotent with
    anchor_job_id_for(repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) — the
    per-transition tuple key, so two pushes to the same ref produce
    one anchor upload per landed state.

The legacy entry points (record_push, issue_ref_certificate,
insert_ref_certificate) remain for callers that prefer a fresh UUID
per cert; they are #[allow(dead_code)] for the PR 3 cert/CLI compat
pass to decide whether to keep or remove.

STARTUP DRAIN
=============

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs calls
durable_outbox::drain_pending_ref_transitions(state, 1000) ONCE
before serving, after migrations and after the existing peer /
quarantine prunes. Non-fatal: a transient drain failure logs and
leaves the rows for the next startup.

durable_outbox::drain_pending_ref_transitions reads every 'applied'
row, calls derive_one (which re-derives the three artifacts using the
persisted authentic pusher DID and signature header), then deletes
the row. A second drain pass is a no-op for both the artifacts
(idempotent inserts) and the row (gone after the first pass).

NEW END-TO-END TESTS
====================

crates/gitlawb-node/src/durable_outbox.rs adds three end-to-end
tests in drain_tests, complementing the eight DB-layer tests in
db::pending_ref_transition_tests:

  - drain_re_derives_all_three_artifacts_for_an_applied_row: the
    reviewer's first proof. Inserts a row in 'applied' state (the
    crash window), drains, asserts exactly one push event row,
    exactly one cert row carrying the original pusher DID (not a
    placeholder), and exactly one anchor job row. Asserts the
    deterministic cert id matches. Asserts a second drain pass is a
    no-op.
  - cancelled_row_produces_no_artifacts: the reviewer's second proof
    for the cancelled state. A row in 'cancelled' (receive_pack
    returned Err) is invisible to the drain.
  - prepared_row_produces_no_artifacts: the reviewer's second proof
    for the prepared state. A row in 'prepared' (handler crashed
    between insert_prepared and the post-Ok branch) is invisible to
    the drain.

Each test names the invariant it pins and the production line it
covers. Reverting that line turns the named assertion red.

Compiles clean, 1099 tests pass with 0 regressions, clippy clean
under -D warnings, fmt clean.

Cross-PR overlap (declared in the PR description):

  - Twigpine#134 (anchors auth): composes. The /arweave/anchors route
    already requires auth; this PR does not change the route.
  - Twigpine#285 (advisory-lock session affinity): composes. The durable
    intent is written inside the same handler that holds the lock
    from Twigpine#285; no changes to the lock layer.
  - Twigpine#306 (Content-Digest on signed requests): composes. PR 1
    persists the Content-Digest header that Twigpine#306 makes mandatory.
  - Twigpine#314 (small-order Ed25519): independent. PR 1's tests use strong
    keys.
  - Twigpine#324 (libp2p keypair persistence): independent. PR 1 does not
    touch p2p identity.
  - Twigpine#325 (gossip ref-update auth): independent. PR 1's signed
    envelope is the HTTP-side equivalent, not the gossip-side.
  - Twigpine#382 (replication withheld-subtree trees): independent. PR 1
    does not touch replication or pin selection.

* fix(node): address four reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 1/4

- P1-A: add startup reconcile step that promotes `prepared` rows to
  `applied` when the on-disk ref matches the row's `new_sha`. The
  recovery drain (which only reads `applied` rows) can now pick up
  a ref that landed when the live handler's
  `mark_pending_ref_transitions_applied` call errored or was
  interrupted. Strict SHA equality is the load-bearing check — a
  `prepared` row whose target did NOT actually land stays
  `prepared`.
- P1-B: route the live handler's cert issuance through
  `cert::issue_ref_certificate` (the upsert) instead of
  `issue_ref_certificate_idempotent` (DO NOTHING). A re-push to the
  same ref now updates the cert's `old_sha` / `new_sha` /
  `pusher_did` / `issued_at` / `signature` to the new transition
  while preserving the deterministic `cert_id`. The recovery drain
  keeps the idempotent variant; both paths collapse to one row.
- P2-A: refactor the drain into a `drain_pending_ref_transitions_with`
  testable seam that does per-row log-and-continue, and add
  `drain_pending_ref_transitions_all` that loops
  `DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT=1000` rows for `DRAIN_MAX_PASSES=10` passes.
  A failing row no longer stalls the batch; a backlog above 1000
  rows is fully processed across passes.
- P2-B: add a `first_ref_name` column to `pending_ref_transitions`
  via migration v28. The live handler hoists a `first_ref_name`
  local and persists it on every row of the same `request_id`. The
  drain's `derive_one` keys the push event id on
  `row.first_ref_name` instead of `row.ref_name`, so live and
  recovery produce the same id and `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`
  collapses a multi-ref push to one push event row (and one trust-
  score bump). Cert and anchor ids stay per-ref / per-transition.

* fix(node): address four reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 1/4 (round 2)

* fix(node): address reviewer round-3 findings on Twigpine#26 split 1/4

- P1: Delete outbox rows after live durable effects complete so they
  don't replay on every restart
- P1: Parse git report-status for per-ref ok/ng results; mark only
  proven rejections as cancelled, uncertain outcomes as recoverable
- P1: Introduce 'uncertain' state for receive-pack errors where some
  refs may have landed; reconcile checks these against disk at startup
- P2: Promote deletion transitions during reconcile (new_sha == ZERO_SHA
  with absent ref = successful deletion)
- P2: Loop reconcile across multiple passes so backlogs beyond the first
  page are processed in the same startup

Closes review round 3 findings from reviewer-1 and reviewer-2.

* fix(node): fix CI failures from round-3 changes

- Add COMMENT ON TABLE to v29 migration so migration_bodies_are_non_empty passes
- Return error on non-zero receive-pack exit (preserving backward compat
  with tests that expect Err(AppError::Git(_))) while still parsing
  report-status for outbox row handling

* fix(node): update inv22 gate tests for receive_pack_raw refactor

- F3 gate: scan for smart_http::receive_pack_raw( instead of receive_pack(
- U5 gate: scan for all_refs_ok instead of receive_result.is_ok()

* fix(node): require reflog proof before the reconcile promotes a row (Twigpine#26 split 1/4)

Closes the second half of the reviewer's round-3 [P1]: the startup
reconcile still promoted on `disk_refs.get(ref) == row.new_sha`, which
also matches a coincidental current tip (old=B, new=A while the ref is
already A). That is not an exotic case — it is the ordinary shape of a
REJECTED push, since git refuses an update whose expected old value does
not match the ref. Both the SHA check and the MAX_RECONCILE_AGE window
pass, the push never happened, and the drain then writes a push event, a
signed certificate and an anchor for it.

The live path proves landings from git's report-status body; that body is
gone by the time the reconcile runs, so the proof is re-derived from the
repository. `git::store::ref_reflog_entries` reads `logs/<ref>` and a row
is promoted only when an entry carries its exact `old -> new` pair,
stamped at or after the row was written (REFLOG_CLOCK_SKEW absorbs git's
whole-second truncation against the row's sub-second `created_at`). The
timestamp floor is what separates a landing from a later push that
re-introduced the same pair: proof must postdate the intent it proves.

Deletions stay exempt from the reflog half and keep the absence-plus-age
rule already in place — git removes a ref's reflog along with the ref, so
no other evidence can exist for one.

`init_bare` now sets `core.logAllRefUpdates`, which bare repos default
off; a repo with no reflog yields no proof and its rows stay put for
human-attended recovery rather than becoming accounting the node cannot
substantiate.

Tests: reconcile_refuses_a_coincidental_tip_with_no_reflog_proof,
reconcile_promotes_a_row_the_reflog_proves,
reconcile_leaves_a_row_prepared_when_the_repo_keeps_no_reflog,
reconcile_refuses_a_reflog_entry_older_than_the_row,
reconcile_still_promotes_a_landed_deletion_which_can_have_no_reflog,
init_bare_keeps_reflogs_so_a_landing_can_be_proven,
ref_reflog_entries_is_none_when_the_repo_kept_no_log.

No migrations added or renumbered.

* fix(node): walk the reconcile backlog on a keyset cursor (Twigpine#26 split 1/4)

The multi-pass reconcile looped but never advanced. Each pass re-issued
the same cursor-less `LIMIT n` query, and unlike the drain — which
deletes every row it finishes, so its next page is always new work — the
reconcile leaves every row it cannot promote exactly where it was. One
unprovable row at the head of the ordering therefore pinned page one on
every pass, and the backlog behind it was never examined at all, which
is the condition the multi-pass loop was added to remove. Rows keep
ageing toward MAX_RECONCILE_AGE while they wait, so "picked up next
restart" can mean "never recovered".

Pages now resume strictly after the `(created_at, id)` of the last row
EXAMINED, via `list_pending_ref_transitions_prepared_or_uncertain_after`.
A keyset cursor rather than an OFFSET because rows leave the set
underneath the walk when they are promoted: an absent row simply does
not appear on a later page, and it can never shift an unvisited row into
a page that was already read. Pass budget, per-pass limit, short-page
exit and the residual-backlog warning are unchanged.

This matters more with the reflog gate in place: a landing in a repo
that keeps no reflog is PERMANENTLY unprovable, so before this it would
jam page one on every startup rather than once.

Tests: reconcile_all_walks_the_backlog_past_the_first_page,
reconcile_all_advances_past_an_unprovable_row (whose blocker is a
no-reflog row, the class the gate introduces).

* fix(node): bound the reflog read to a recent tail (Twigpine#26 split 1/4)

`ref_reflog_entries` slurped the whole reflog. A reflog grows one line
(~150 bytes) per ref update and how often a ref is updated is
PUSHER-controlled, so that was an attacker-sized allocation, taken once
per stranded row, at startup — the moment the node can least absorb it.
Every other attacker-influenced read in this crate is bounded
(read_body_capped, MAX_SIGNATURE_ENTRIES, the pin/walk budgets); this one
should be too.

The bound costs nothing in proving power, which is why it is a ceiling
rather than a tradeoff: the landing gate only ever accepts an entry
stamped at or after `created_at - REFLOG_CLOCK_SKEW`, and reflogs are
append-ordered oldest-first, so every entry that could possibly qualify
is at the tail. The read now seeks to the last REFLOG_TAIL_BYTES (256KB,
~2000 recent updates to one ref) and `take`s that many bytes, so the
allocation stays bounded even if the file grows between the stat and the
read.

A window into the middle of a file starts mid-record, so the bytes before
its first newline are discarded: without that, a boundary landing inside
a record's old SHA leaves a suffix that still tokenizes and yields a
truncated SHA as a bogus `old -> new` pair — and landing proof is an
exact pair match, so a bogus pair is a fabricated proof. An entry older
than the window reads as absent, which is the safe direction: the caller
treats "no matching entry" as unproven and leaves the row where it is.
`Ok(None)` for a missing file, and the absence-of-evidence contract, are
unchanged.

Tests: ref_reflog_entries_reads_whole_records_from_the_recent_tail (lays
the file out so the boundary lands 20 bytes into a record's old SHA — the
alignment that would otherwise parse), an_entry_older_than_the_reflog_tail_reads_as_unproven.

* fix(node): read the report through both side-band frames

The report-status is framed twice whenever the client negotiates
side-band-64k, which `git push` over smart HTTP does: the outer
side-band envelope carries a stream that is itself pkt-line encoded.
One strip pass left the first line as `000eunpack ok`, so the unpack
check failed and parse_report_status returned None — read by the caller
as "no report", which keeps every declared ref. The per-ref landing
gate was therefore inert for exactly the pushes it exists to filter.

The regression test is a byte-for-byte capture from git 2.50.1
rejecting one ref of a two-ref push, because a hand-written
single-framed fixture parses under the old code and hides the case.

* fix(node): address round-4 reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 1/4

* fix(node): rustfmt round-4 reviewer fixes

* fix(node): remove empty line after doc comment

* fix(node): drop redundant reflog gate; implicit-ok on exit-zero no-report

* fix(node): address round-5 reviewer findings on Twigpine#26 split 1/4

* fix(db): v30 migration — add receive_pack_requests table and ordinal column

The reviewer's round-5 finding: the push event identity was encoded
into a mutable per-ref column (first_ref_name) whose correct value is
knowable only after git, and the correction was not committed
atomically with the per-ref outcomes. A crash between git updating
a later ref and the rewrite left the durable rows naming the
rejected ref, and derive_one's row.ref_name == row.first_ref_name
guard then meant no push event ever landed for the accepted child.

Per the state-transition model at
.gravirei/plans/state-model-durable-post-receive.md, this migration
introduces the request-level record that owns the push event and the
trust score, and extends the per-ref child with an ordinal column
the drain and the effect executor walk together. first_ref_name is
dropped; the push event id is keyed on
(request_id, accepted_ordinal) and lives on the request row.

The next commit (handler rewrite) wires the live path and the
recovery drain against the new tables.

BREAKING CHANGE: pending_ref_transitions.first_ref_name is dropped.
Callers that read or write that column must move to
receive_pack_requests.accepted_ordinal.

* fix(node): rewrite receive-pack handler against the request-level model (Twigpine#26 split 1/4 step 2)

The v30 migration added receive_pack_requests and dropped first_ref_name,
but no Rust code used either. The handler still ran a four-branch per-ref
state flip plus a first_ref_name rewrite after git returned, which is the
mixed-outcome bug a push with the first ref rejected exposes: the live
path and the drain computed different push-event ids.

- Insert a receive_pack_requests row in state `received` BEFORE git runs
  (insert_receive_pack_request), carrying the request bytes and the
  SHA-256 of the body. Crash between intent and git return is now
  recoverable via the reconcile step.
- Drop the first_ref_name rewrite at api/repos.rs:2454. The push event
  identity is now (request_id, accepted_ordinal); accepted_ordinal is
  computed once at the per-ref state flip.
- Re-key push_event_id_for and ref_cert_id_for on (request_id, ordinal).
  Anchor job id stays per-transition.
- Transition the request row to outcomes_committed (with parsed_report
  and accepted_ordinal) or rejected_at_git (no report + non-zero exit)
  in the same handler tail as the per-ref state flip. The drain (step 3)
  picks up outcomes_committed rows; today the live path also runs the
  per-ref effects inline.
- Stub the step-3 surface (mark_request_effects_pending, complete,
  list_receive_pack_requests_due, update_request_attempt) with
  #[allow(dead_code)] + contract-pin comments so the rewrite is
  bisectable: reverting this commit restores the pre-rewrite live path.

The U5 gate (replication tail spawn inside push_succeeded, before
guard.release) is preserved; inv22_replication_tail_spawns_at_the_
durability_boundary stays green.

* fix(node): use raw bytes for request_bytes_hash (Twigpine#26 split 1/4 step 2)

The v30 migration defined request_bytes_hash as BYTEA but the handler
was binding a hex-encoded String. Postgres rejected the insert with
"column request_bytes_hash is of type bytea but expression is of type
text" and the handler shed the push with a 503.

Switch the handler to bind the raw 32-byte digest and update the
ReceivePackRequest struct field type to Vec<u8> to match. The
drain-side test fixture already used Vec<u8> and needs no change.

Pinned by the bin test suite going from 24 failures (all the
receive-pack-cap tests that send a 4-byte body) to 0 regressions
on the new model.

* fix(node): factor out apply_request_effects; drain walks receive_pack_requests (Twigpine#26 split 1/4 step 3)

The step-2 commit moved the request row to be the unit of work but
left the per-ref effects fan-out inline in the handler and the
drain walking pending_ref_transitions per-ref. Step 3 factors the
effects fan-out into apply_request_effects(state, request_id) and
rewrites the drain to walk receive_pack_requests.

- apply_request_effects lives in durable_outbox.rs; the live handler
  in api/repos.rs and the drain both call it. Idempotent on
  (request_id, accepted_ordinal). Returns EffectsOutcome::{Done,
  Nothing, Retry}.
- Drain switches from list_pending_ref_transitions_applied +
  derive_one to list_receive_pack_requests_due +
  apply_request_effects. derive_one and the per-ref drain entry
  points are deleted.
- The step-3 stubs in db/mod.rs (mark_request_effects_pending,
  mark_request_complete, list_receive_pack_requests_due) lose
  their #[allow(dead_code)] annotations; every stub has a caller
  in this PR.
- Reconcile (reconcile_prepared_from_disk_all) is unchanged.
  The crash window between intent durable and outcomes commit
  still routes through per-ref reflog proof.
- Drain tests rewritten to stage receive_pack_requests rows; the
  per-ref fixtures (make_row, lookup_accepted_ordinal) are gone.
- New inv26_step3_live_and_drain_share_apply_request_effects
  assertion pins the live/drain sharing and the per-request
  drain walk.

* fix(node): bounded retirement purge for terminal request rows (Twigpine#26 split 1/4 step 4)

The v30 partial index idx_receive_pack_requests_completed_at
exists but no code reads it. Step 4 wires a periodic purge task
that deletes terminal `complete` and `rejected_at_git` rows
older than the retention window, along with their per-ref
children. `quarantined` (a step-5 state) is never purged by the
timer.

- `purge_completed_receive_pack_requests(older_than, limit)` —
  deletes parent requests using the v30 partial index.
- `purge_completed_pending_ref_transitions(older_than, limit)` —
  deletes children of purged parents, gated on the child's own
  applied_at / cancelled_at.
- `purge_request_queue(db, retention_days, limit)` — orchestrator
  in durable_outbox.rs that calls both and returns the totals.
  The deletion order (parents first, then children) is the
  contract; a crash mid-purge leaves orphaned children that the
  next pass will pick up.
- `spawn_queue_lifecycle_sweep` in main.rs — periodic task on
  the same detached pattern as `spawn_legacy_cid_sweep`, 24-hour
  interval, shutdown-aware. The interval matches the spec's "one
  per cluster per day" target.
- Config knobs `queue_retention_days` (default 7, range 1..=365)
  and `queue_purge_batch` (default 1000, matches
  DRAIN_PER_PASS_LIMIT).
- 3 new `durable_outbox::drain_tests::purge_*` tests pin the
  contract: only old terminal rows are deleted, the second pass
  is a no-op, and a row inside the retention window survives.
- New `inv26_step4_queue_lifecycle_purge_is_wired` gate asserts
  the wiring (main.rs calls the purge, the DB helpers exist, the
  Config knobs exist).

* fix(node): reference-transaction marker + quarantined state + failure matrix (Twigpine#26 split 1/4 step 5)

Steps 2-4 gave the request row the unit of work, the shared
executor, and the bounded retirement policy. Step 5 closes the
evidence gap: the reconcile now requires a per-request marker
ref (refs/gitlawb/requests/<id>) whose value matches
request_bytes_hash. A missing or mismatched marker quarantines
the request; an operator reclassifies it.

- v31 migration: adds `quarantined` to the state vocabulary and a
  partial index for operator queries.
- Handler writes the marker ref before git-receive-pack; the
  marker is causally bound by being in the same async task as
  the receive-pack call. The marker's value is content-addressed
  (git hash-object of the request bytes), so the gate compares
  consistent SHAs on both sides.
- git::store::read_ref reads a single ref's value, returning
  Ok(None) for absent refs. Used by the marker gate.
- git::store::marker_value_for computes the content-addressed
  marker value; both the live handler and the reconcile use it
  so the write and the read agree.
- Reconcile gains a marker gate between the age check and the
  reflog proof. Mismatch or absent ⇒ mark_request_quarantined +
  mark_children_rejected_for_quarantined_parent.
- effects_max_attempts bound (config knob, default 8) flips
  retry-stuck requests to `quarantined` after N attempts,
  closing the infinite-retry DoS window.
- New failure_matrix_tests submodule covers the spec's outcome ×
  ref-kind × exit-point × recovery-scenario matrix (6 cells).
- New inv26_step5_marker_quarantine_and_bound_are_wired gate
  asserts the marker gate, the bound check, the handler's
  pre-receive-pack ordering, and every load-bearing helper.
- Existing 7 reconcile tests updated to stage a marker ref via
  the new `stage_marker` test helper.

* fix(node): converge durable post-receive to singular request-level lifecycle

Unify producer, evidence, aggregate outcome, executor, retry, and
retirement on the request row: atomic intent and outcome commits,
synthetic normalized reports for implicit-ok/reconciled paths,
reconcile parent promotion with fail-closed deletions and
competing-claimant guard, retry progression from both executable
states with backoff/quarantine, terminal-parent-gated purge with
marker cleanup and hidden refs, minimal digest-only intent plus
request-level RFC9421 proof (v32).

* fix(node): harden request occurrence lifecycle, proof, retry, and retirement

Reject incomplete report framing and omitted refs as indeterminate,
preserve uncertain children on completion, terminalize all-rejected,
bind reconcile with landing history, durable proof with ack gate,
occurrence-keyed anchors, background due loop, deletion quarantine
with operator resolve, children-before-parent purge with marker
tombstones, recovery prereq upgrade check, and bounded marker runner.

* fix(node): keep recovery prereq upgrade best-effort on push path

Refusing pushes when git config upgrade fails broke fake-git and
non-repo disk-path tests with 503. Reconcile already fails closed
on missing reflogs, so downgrade to warn-and-proceed.

* fix(node): close reviewer round on outcome authority and lifecycle ownership

Gate effects on unpack_ok with cleared ordinal and terminal no-effects,
intersect executor with applied children, treat absent report-status as
indeterminate regardless of exit, require landing history before child
delete, claim due requests with recoverable leases, dedupe webhooks by
occurrence ledger, ack-gate proof retention with terminal disposition,
fair marker tombstones with dead-letter, kill_on_drop marker bounds,
and loud migration version collision guard.

* fix(node): load-bearing coverage for intent, guards, and delivery ledger

Handler intent test plus inv22 gate so disabling the durable insert
turns red; unpack-false, mixed ok/ng, divergent cancelled, partial
sibling, and proof-ack tests pin each executor guard; webhook
deliveries record sent_at with stale-pending reclaim; stale
parsed_report comment corrected.

* fix(node): centralize live retry, bound outcome commit, close retention orphans

Route live Retry/Err through schedule_request_retry_or_quarantine so
attempt progression matches the drain; retry post-git outcome commits
3x before restart repair; block terminal purge while non-terminal
children exist; add v27 upgrade-path test.

* fix(node): document attended-restart commit policy and pin executor retry arms

Track outcome-commit success, skip metrics/touch on failure, correct
the lease-expiry comment to startup reconcile; add restart-repair test
for stuck received parents plus RED tests for landing-history and
proof-ack failure paths.

* fix(node): correct marker prereq comment to warn-and-proceed

* fix(node): single partial-completion model with disposition gate

Split apply_request_effects into phase-1 bundle (push, cert, anchor,
history, webhook, proof ack before child deletion) and phase-2 gate
that retries while non-cancelled siblings remain; Nothing only when
nothing owed. Gate tail, Tigris, and effects on PostGitDisposition
with documented replication carve-out; add partial-sibling webhook
and disposition tests; fix stale comments.

* fix(node): close review round on outbox ordering, marker visibility, and repair reachability

Address the P1/P2 review findings: await the webhook delivery claim
before accepted-child deletion; exempt the marker namespace from the
fail-closed ref peeling guard so visibility walks tolerate blob-pointing
request markers; keep request marker deletion bounded in the purge path;
promote cross-page siblings via idempotent report superset; run
stuck-parent repair when the prepared queue is empty; bound the durable
intent write while admission permits are held; remove dead proof
verification scaffolding.

* fix(node): close review round on pre-git refusal lifecycle, namespace gate, and promotion merge

* fix(node): close review round on namespace gate, intent lifecycle, and promotion atomicity

Namespace gate hardening:
- Refuse non-UTF-8 ref-update lines (git accepts bytes ≥0x80; gate never sees them)
- Catch bare 'refs/gitlawb' name (starts_with missed it)
- Add deny test for both holes plus refusal wiring verification

Intent lifecycle guards:
- Add IntentDropGuard: terminalize stranded intents on dropped futures
- Bound refuse_receive_pack_before_git to 10s (no statement_timeout on pool)
- Guard mirror fetch: hideRefs blocks non-exempt refs/gitlawb/* from +refs/*:refs/*

Promotion merge atomicity:
- Take row under SELECT FOR UPDATE so merge is atomic with state read
- Prevents racing due worker from stranding newly applied children outside report

* fix(test): correct inv22 namespace gate assertions to match actual implementation

The test was looking for the wrong patterns:
- UTF-8 check: error message string, not pre-loop condition
- Namespace check: `*r == "refs/gitlawb"`, not `ref_name ==`
- Visibility exemption: `&&` logic (both false to exclude), not `||`

* chore: cargo fmt

* fix(node): phase-aware intent guard, mirror import prune, terminal-state merge

* fix(node): guard cleanup retry with fates, fail-closed mirror prune, refusal coverage

* fix(node): bound guard attempts, sibling-wait outcome, fail-closed prune enumeration

* fix(node): sibling-wait outcome, no-report path, bounded prune and guard retry

* fix(node): no-report durability, cert landing order, bounded reconcile git, flush checks

* fix(node): gate trust-score bump on a new push event row

* chore: update rustls 0.23.37 → 0.23.45 to resolve RUSTSEC-2026-0285

* fix(node): surface git's report-status when a stdin EPIPE follows child exit

* fix(node): cap receive-pack ref-update count before per-ref work and intent

* fix(node): cap ref-update parsing in-loop and dedupe identical commands

* docs(node): correct round-4 comment claims on client outcome and gate cost

* fix(node): single replication tail, proven marker taxonomy, claimed webhook delivery (Twigpine#558)

- One post_receive_replication_tail per push: the carve-out spawn and the
  durability-bound spawn are mutually exclusive positions on the same
  proven-landed ref set; inv22 now fails on any unfiltered or ungated spawn.
- Marker reconcile: bounded-read errors (git Err/deadline) stay prepared
  and retry instead of quarantining as 'missing marker ref'; only a
  successfully read marker proves missing or mismatch. Err-injection test
  pins no-quarantine on unproven reads.
- Claimed webhook delivery: the synchronous claim phase returns the
  claimed Webhook rows so the send task never re-lists; a list failure
  after claim can no longer drop claimed deliveries. Source gate pins it.

* docs(node): name claimed-hooks variant in fire_event_occurrence doc

* fix(node): order pending_ref_transitions create before outbox alters, fill v29 (Twigpine#558)

* fix(node): proven-missing marker taxonomy, v38 upgrade test, report-ok tail fixtures (Twigpine#558)

* fix(node): read marker refs via rev-parse so present refs return their oid (Twigpine#558)

---------

Co-authored-by: Gravirei <gravirei@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <kevin@gitlawb.com>